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Contract-Mediated Interorganizational 
Interactions
Santosh Shrivastava, Newcastle University
A mediation service for monitoring terms of service can facilitate 
collaboration in virtual organizations by ensuring secure, private access 
to service resources. 
Opportunities abound for combining the Internet's many exciting services and resources into 
new, value-added interorganizational services. Increasingly, such collaborative ventures, or 
virtual organizations, will encourage strategic alliances among groups of organizations that 
share services electronically to satisfy mutual business goals. These arrangements allow each 
organization to maintain its autonomy except for the alliance's agreed-on undertakings. 
VO operations management requires regulated access to service resources so that organization-
specific resource-sharing policies occur securely and with integrity a difficult situation 
because each potentially accessible organization might not unconditionally trust the others. 
Accordingly, all organizations in a VO will require strictly controlled and policed interactions. 
So, business process relationships will require protected trust management procedures for 
terms and conditions rules that typically govern a conventional business partnership laid 
down in a paper-based contract (see the related sidebar) and quality of service.1-3
So, we envision a VO requiring a mediation service for monitoring and enforcing terms and 
conditions as well as a QoS-monitoring service. One or more trusted third parties (TTPs) 
could provide these two services. Indeed, legal regulatory requirements might explicitly state 
that third parties must provide such services. At Newcastle University, my distributed systems 
research group has addressed several design issues for the mediation service. 
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Conversations
A VO supported by protected trust management procedures needs electronic representations 
of its terms and conditions contracts. This lets a service mediate the rights and obligations that 
each interacting entity promises to honor. In the worst case, the mediation service would 
detect and notify all interested parties of violations of agreed interactions. For this, the service 
would need to maintain a nonrepudiable audit trail of all interactions. To do this, the 
organizations taking part in the VO would need to convert the original natural language terms-
and-conditions contract written by their lawyers and other nontechnical people into a machine-
interpretable specification that they can use to mediate the business conversations. We define 
a conversation as a small business activity executed between two or more business partners to 
perform a well-defined task such as issue a purchase order or reimbursement, process 
payment, or cancel a purchase order. In our group, we looked at creating conversation 
specifications by carefully studying rights, obligations, and prohibitions in contract clauses 
written in a natural language. 
You can abstract business contracts as a set of permissions (P), obligations (O), and 
prohibitions (F) that actors (also called agents or roles) must fulfill to benefit others by 
performing (or not performing) actions (also called operations). We define a permission as an 
action that an actor (say, a buyer or a seller) can perform if desired. 
For instance, "The buyer can use his discretion to send a purchase order to the seller" is a 
buyer's permission that benefits the seller. Likewise, we define an obligation as an action that 
an actor is expected to perform; an example of a seller's obligation for the benefit of the buyer 
is "The seller is obliged to respond to the buyer within three days after receiving the purchase 
order." A prohibition is an action that an actor should not perform. An example of a seller's 
prohibition for the benefit of the buyer is "The seller shall not send offers to the buyer unless 
they are requested." 
Executing a permission operation is optional in the sense that an actor doesn't incur penalties 
for not executing it; conversely, failing to execute an obligation operation or daring to execute 
a prohibited operation are contract violations, subjecting the offending actor to a possible 
sanction. A sanction can take different forms for instance, it can grant the offended actor a 
permission (for example, the permission to charge 10 percent on top of the original price), it 
could refuse the offending actor a permission, or it could assign the offending actor a new 
obligation (for example, paying a fine). Figure 1 shows a small, hypothetical business contract 
that stipulates business action interactions between a buyer and a seller for the purchase of 
goods. 
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Figure 1. A hypothetical business contract stipulating business action interactions.
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permission, obligation, or prohibition originated. In the contract, clause 3.1 specifies 
prohibitions for the buyer and for the seller. To distinguish between these two cases, we 
named them F3.1B and F3.1S. Similarly, P4.1B and P4.1S stand for permissions for the buyer 
and the seller extracted from clause 4.1. 
Contract permissions, obligations, prohibitions, and sanctions.
Table 1 lists the permissions, obligations, and prohibitions that comprise the contract. The 
number after P, O, and F is the number of the clause in the contract from which the 
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creating its executable version, yet it contains important information for this stage. For 
instance, it has enough information to begin reasoning about the contract's correctness. 
We can further refine the description in figure 1 to include implementation-specific technical 
details such as acknowledgments and synchronization messages. To show what an 
implementation-oriented contract looks like, we'll assume that the seller and the buyer have 
agreed to use the widely adopted RosettaNet process specification standard.4 In RosettaNet, a 
buyer must use the Request Purchase Order partner interface process, PIP 3A4, to express a 
desire to buy (see figure 2). The seller must use the Notification of Invoice PIP (PIP 3C3) to 
invoice the buyer. The specification of such PIPs includes sending both business action 
messages and business signal messages. Recipients of a business action message must 
acknowledge it by sending a business signal message back. 
Figure 2. Conversation regarding a request for a purchase order.
As it stands, this contract might not have enough details for the technical people in charge of 
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Figure 3. A modification of the contract in figure 1 to include (in bold) business signal 
messages for synchronization.
In other work, we describe how you can convert contract specifications into finite state 
machine representations and check and their correctness properties.5,6 The World Wide Web 
Consortium is developing a standard on Web service choreography, WS-CDL, that defines a 
language for specifying conversations.7
Mediation service
synchronize their interactions. The new clauses appear in bold font. 
Figure 3 shows parts of the modified English text version of the implementation-oriented 
contract. This version is different from the original one in that, it includes (in addition to the 
business actions messages) business signal messages to help the two business partners 
Conceptually speaking, a mediation service sits between business partners so it can observe 
their business interactions. Each enterprise expects access to others' services, but the 
mediation service allows an operation to take place only if the contract's rules permit it and 
then only if invoked by a legitimate role within a participating enterprise. So, the mediator 
performs access control by intercepting all contractual operations that parties might try to 
perform. Our approach represents conversations as finite state machines and uses role-based 
access control for authenticated access. The SDSD (state-dependent security decision) 
approach addresses relevant design issues. Each enterprise is autonomously responsible for its 
own role management and role assignments, thereby ensuring that each enterprise controls its 
own people and resource management policies. We assume that different roles will have the 
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permissions, obligations, and prohibitions to send messages of different types (requesting 
purchase orders, invoice notifications, payments, and so on.). 
Our approach allows either centralized (see figure 4a), where for illustrative purposes we 
assume an interaction between buyer and seller), or distributed (see figure 4b) deployment. In 
a centralized deployment, a single TTP deploys the service. A single state machine represents 
a given conversation; an incoming message is checked for its role as well as associated 
permissions and obligations. If these are correct, it forwards the message to its final 
destination; it drops incorrect ones. Figure 5 shows the centralized mediated version of the 
purchase order conversation. Once deployed, the mediation service will guarantee that only 
legal messages (right type, sequence, and time) reach their final destination. Participants can 
trust incoming messages as correct and act on them with the guarantee that the mediator has 
already approved them; furthermore, it guarantees applications that illegal messages sent 
accidentally will never reach their counterparts. 
Figure 4. (a) Centralized and (b) decentralized deployment.
7
IEEE Distributed Systems Online  November 2005 
Figure 5. Mediated request purchase order conversation.
In a distributed deployment, the mediation functionality splits, with each side implementing 
one side of the conversation state machine. Figure 4 shows just two of several deployment 
scenarios. Determining which particular model suits a given VO setting poses an interesting 
research problem worthy of further investigation. Distributed deployments also face the 
challenge of keeping contract state information synchronized with all the mediators. For 
example, a valid message forwarded by the buyer's side could be dropped at the seller's end 
because intervening communication delays render the message untimely (and therefore 
invalid) at the seller side. State synchronization is necessary to ensure that both parties either 
agree to treat the message as valid or invalid. 
The story doesn't end here. The mediation service must also provide facilities for 
nonrepudiated interactions, which is a research topic in its own right, and so my discussion 
here will be brief. 
To support nonrepudiated interactions for regulating interactions, a given action must be 
attributable to the party who performed the action and commitments made must be 
attributable to the committing party. For example, a client shouldn't be able to subsequently 
disavow the request or a service's consumption. So, to regulate an interaction, we require 
action attribution, validation, and auditing of the parties involved. Nonrepudiable attribution 
binds an action to the party performing the action. Validation determines an action's legality 
with respect to interaction agreements. Auditing ensures that evidence is available in case of 
dispute and to inform subsequent interactions. 
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For example, to deliver a message from A to B:
  B may require nonrepudiation of origin (NRO) of the message irrefutable 
evidence that the message originated at A, and 
  A may require nonrepudiation of receipt (NRR) of the message irrefutable 
evidence that B received the message. Nonrepudiation is usually achieved using public 
key cryptography. 
If A signs a message with its private key, B can confirm the message's origin by verifying the 
signature using A's public key. Similarly, given B's signature on the message, A can confirm 
receipt by verifying the signature using B's public key. To support the assertion that a key 
used to sign evidence wasn't compromised at time of use and for audit trail logs, a mutually 
trusted third-party timestamping service should timestamp the signed evidence. Elsewhere, we 
describe how you can use component middleware to implement nonrepudiation.9
Conclusion
Our work described how to mediate the rights and obligations to services for simple contracts. 
However, contracts can be quite complicated and much research is under way on contract 
representation.10-12
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Terms and Conditions
A partner in a VO providing a service to other partners will need several assurances for 
example, that the service invoker can invoke the operation or has been authenticated as well 
as evidence of maintained interaction (nonrepudiation). Service consumers will need 
complementary assurances that we call terms and conditions monitoring and enforcement. 
Terms and conditions express what operations or actions the business partner is permitted, 
obliged, and prohibited to execute. Additionally, the rules stipulate when and in what order to 
execute the operations. For instance, for a buyer-seller business partnership, the contract will 
stipulate when the buyer must submit purchase orders and within how many days of receiving 
the purchase order the seller must deliver the goods, and so on. 
In addition to terms and conditions, providers and consumers also need service-level 
agreements stating the quality of service, such as availability and response time. For example, 
within a business-to-business auction, the auctioneer might need to guarantee that "even 
during peak periods, invoking the place_bid operation will complete successfully within 
two seconds when fewer than 100 bidders are logged in." For most services, any degradation 
by the consumer in the perceived QoS level can have serious negative consequences. 
Providers should ensure that the offered service meets the agreed QoS. Contractual SLAs 
should specify the QoS level delivered to the consumer. As the name suggests, monitoring 
contractual SLAs involves collecting statistical metrics about a service's performance to 
evaluate whether the provider complies with the expected QoS level. 
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